Foreword by Wallace, Maurice





When feminist critic and theorist Toril Moi undertook a grappling with the 
deceptively simple sentence “What is a woman?” in her eponymous 1999 work,1 
the question carried the pitch of a riddle.  With Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second 
Sex2 for its touchstone, Moi’s title essay posited “a theory of the sexually differ-
ent body”3 that invoked de Beauvoir specifically in order to identify where, by a 
too-narrow apprehension of a wide-reaching de Beauvoir, contemporary femi-
nist thought lost its way.  Taking too much for granted what it has presumed to 
know for at least a generation about the difference between sex and gender, con-
temporary feminist theory, according to Moi, today mistakes its “reformist” 
conclusions for “revolutionary” ones inasmuch it continues to retain “as starting 
points for [its] theories of subjectivity, identity, and bodily sexual difference”4 
the self-same sex/gender distinction it’s been intently dedicated to deconstruct-
ing.  That is, while poststructuralist feminists have been careful to insist upon 
the social constructedness of gender, and have decried the impulse of the previ-
ous generation to essentialize sex by reflexively (and misleadingly) opposing 
gender to sex  (sex being merely “the . . . surface on which the script of gender is 
written”5), these theorists nevertheless require fundamentally what they reject.  
Perhaps then, Moi suggests, much less is known about “what it means to be a 
woman (or a man) in a given society”6 than we imagine, the impressive evolu-
tion of feminist thought since the 1960s notwithstanding.  In Moi, academic 
feminism is urged therefore to return to its first works: “Lacan returned to 
Freud; it is time for feminists to return to Beauvoir”7 for “exactly the kind of 
non-essentialist, concrete, historical and social understanding of the body that so 
many contemporary feminists,” bedeviled by their structuralist disavowals, “are 
looking for.”8  But returning again to feminism’s first works may not be entirely 
possible, it turns out.  Reading Ian Halley’s provocative essay Queer Theory By 
Men,9 one has the sense that in the pursuit of an improved epistemology of sex, 
gender and the body, feminism is its own worst antagonist. 
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In the fall of 2002, Harvard University Law Professor Janet Halley deliv-
ered the annual Brainerd Currie Memorial Lecture at the Duke University 
School of Law.  That lecture, A Map of Feminist and Queer Theories of Sexuality and 
Sexual Regulation,10 formed the basis of what was to become, under the signature 
of Ian Halley, Queer Theory by Men, the feature essay in this issue of the Duke 
Journal of Gender Law and Policy.  If there is a singular idea distinguishing Hal-
ley’s Queer Theory By Men from other avowedly left reflections on today’s legal 
gender troubles, it is surely his appeal to an epistemologically inflected politics 
of divergence between feminism and other  pro-sex projects like  pornography 
studies, sex liberationism, and queer theory.  Halley proposes, in short, that 
gender and queer theorists “Take a Break from Feminism.”11 For on the legal 
question of what a woman is, to reframe Moi, or, on the problem of power in 
erotic contexts, any determinedly feminist effort to explain such quandries is 
bound to short-circuit and frustrate its own feminist aims.  The trouble with 
feminism, he avers, is its resignation—its reductiveness, one might say—to a 
categorical binarity it cannot, in spite of itself, seem to get around or through, 
despite its accepted hybridities of history, race, class, and method.  Although 
“different feminisms”, he points out, distinguish women and men “differently” 
(“[S]ome see men and women, some see male and female, some see masculine 
and feminine”12), under them all, Halley argues, “men” and “women” are “al-
most always” conceived as two discrete, if still yet distinct, human groups none-
theless.13  Further, nothing that can be called feminist can avoid turning “in some 
central or core way on [that finally reductive] distinction between M[ale] and 
F[emale].”14  The binary reflex stuck intractably in the craw of academic femi-
nism (set in sharp relief by Moi), then, recommends another course, we are told, 
for more productively theorizing those problematics of sexuality and power that 
feminism has presumptuously, Halley implies, taken for its own proper study. 
In Queer Theory by Men, Halley proposes an analytical departure away from 
properly feminist musings on sex, gender and power toward a more produc-
tively queer theoretical landscape, one more easily impervious to the abjecting 
subordination hypothesis (advanced famously by Catharine MacKinnon) that 
has, on Halley’s view, quietly underwritten feminism for so long.  To the degree 
that  there is a “sexuality side” to what a woman is, in other words, what she is 
is not therefore, feminism’s project exclusively.  The question of what a woman 
is, he means to say, is (or ought to be) also available to “other 
left/liberal/progressive projects that [not only] take sexuality and power as 
their domain of operation . . . [but also] lack a primary focus on M/F [opposi-
tionality] and often do not primarily concern themselves with [the political pre-
sumption that] M>F.”15  Among these parallel projects, Halley marks out queer 
theory as the privileged site of an urgent deconstruction of sex that regards bod-
ies, sex acts, erotic desires, sexual identity and love as wholly disjunctive ideas, 
 
 10. Janet Halley, A Map of Feminist and Queer Theories of Sexuality and Sexual Regulation, 
Brainered Currie Memorial Lecture Series (Nov. 7, 2002). 
 11. Halley, supra note 9, at 7. 
 12. Id. at 8. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id. at 9. 
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too incongruous in fact to uphold a male/female opposition in theory.  It is pre-
cisely because queer theory doesn’t require feminism’s devotion to the identity 
category “woman” (or its historical associations) for a progressive liberationist 
theory of sexuality that Halley forcefully urges us toward the expediency of 
queer theory written by men.  Leo Bersani’s rebellious essay Is the Rectum a 
Grave?16 and Duncan Kennedy’s irreverent Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing and the 
Eroticization of Domination17 are Halley’s touchstones of choice in this dilative call 
for a theory of sex without feminism, “one adequate to the neorealist and post-
modernizing views of the complexity with which legal rules and social actors 
interact.”18  As every call merits a response, it is no surprise that Queer Theory by 
Men found ready commentators in three Duke professors who share with Halley 
some background in critical theory, queer theory, or poststructural feminism. 
Where Halley invoked the legal complexities of Twyman v. Twyman,19 a 1993 
Texas divorce case involving sadomasochistic sex, connubial duty, a premarital 
rape disclosure and emotional abuse in order to expose the axiological limits of 
feminist legal theory in deciding such cases, Jane M. Gaines’s response piece, 
Sexual Semiosis would seem to at once flatter and euchre Halley’s by offering up 
“new unanticipated agents involved in the production of desire” that “an earlier 
feminism might not have imagined”20: namely, pills that offer a short-lived rem-
edy for erectile dysfunction.  Like the legal complicatedness of consent, pain, 
pleasure, and intentionality in Twyman, the unimaginable involvedness of the 
law surrounding domestic abuse and rape amidst the ever-widening commer-
cial availability of Viagra pills and their knock-offs begs “for serious feminist 
consideration,”21 an iteration of first departure from Halley.  In Sexual Semiosis 
Gaines is less interested in Taking a Break from Feminism as she is in Giving 
Feminism a Break, not by a reflexive defense of feminism’s forever-and-always 
utility, but by opposing feminist theory “as establishment,”22 breaking with 
some of its curiously doctrinal presumptions about women’s power(lessness) 
within, for example, the disciplining of sex by marriage law.  “Can we give 
feminism a break long enough to study the emergence of what we might call 
‘popular feminism?’” Gaines asks, instructively.23  It is perhaps at the level of the 
popular (“where,” as Halley says, “power meets the population,” 24) that Gaines 
makes her most important intervention.  For Gaines, how effectively any sex 
project, in popular feminism or queer theory, illuminates the disciplinary in-
strumentality of sex within “the history of a ‘law of husband and wife’ in the 
United States”25 is ultimately the best test of its mettle.  Alive to a place Halley 
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ANALYSIS, CULTURAL ACTIVISM 197 (Douglas Crimp ed., 1988). 
 17. Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of Domination, 26 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 1309 (1992), reprinted in DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY DRESSING ETC. 126 (1993). 
 18. Halley, supra note 9, at 38. 
 19. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). 
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 23. Id. at 59. 
 24. Halley, supra note 9, at 48. 
 25. Gaines, supra note 20, at 64. 
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doesn’t go, Sexual Semiosis takes Queer Theory by Men there, as Gaines posits the 
problem of “marital monogamy”26 as a legalized monopoly on a women’s body, 
in a still deeper interrogation of the kind of decisional conundrum represented 
by Twyman v. Twyman.27 
If Gaines’ Sexual Semiosis seems most concerned with the possibilities of 
advancing sexuality studies precisely where Queer Theory by Men resists tread-
ing, Ranjana Khanna’s comment to Halley, Signatures of the Impossible, is dedi-
cated to the redress of a much-maligned cultural feminism.28  From the first, 
Khanna casts suspicion on Halley’s version of the conceptual and political limits 
of cultural feminism, not only questioning whether “feminism, any more or less 
than queer theory, really [has] to be primarily about gender and the logic of 
m/f,”29 but underlining as well the manifest illogic of the persistent conditions of 
gender subordination rendered, in effect, unassailable now by the so-called gen-
der-free discourse left in the wake of an abdication of feminism.  Khanna is no 
fan of Taking a Break from Feminism, not least because  the very idea of its dis-
cursive possibility is “misguided” and a “ploy that is complicit with a neo-
liberal heterosexist paradigm”30 that queer theory, in spite of Halley, has set 
about to dismantle.  In making her case unequivocally against Halley’s anti-
feminism, however, Khanna follows a decidedly psychoanalytic tack, arguing 
rigorously with Halley’s neglect of Bersani’s Freudian background, especially, in 
making his (Halley’s) case for the utilitarian appeal of certain queer speculations 
on sex by male theorists.  As a result, Halley mistakes the seeming radicality of 
Bersani’s queer commitment to self-dissolution through a sexual jouissance “as 
something peculiar to homosexuality rather than to [the psychoanalytic cate-
gory] of melancholia more generally.”31  He is therefore blind to the critical way 
in which both the melancholic and the gay man’s self-shattering cannot avoid 
the stubborn trace of the past self pressed into their respective psychic archives.  
Perhaps more arrestingly, inside of this melancholic framework, Halley’s dis-
avowal of feminism carries the inescapable reminder of its remainder, despite 
his indifference to it.  Thus, “Ian has not put feminism into question,” Khanna 
concludes; instead, “he has acted out through disavowal” the impossibility of 
feminism’s full undoing.32 
As Khanna’s title hints at, and her article confronts intrepidly, much is to be 
made of the signatory difference obtaining between a past “Janet Halley,” the 
2002 Brainerd Currie lecturer and author of the first draft of Queer Theory by 
Men, and a more recent “Ian Halley,” signatory of the article published here.  
While Khanna submits the difference to a productively Derridean psychoanaly-
sis (“Ian seems to want to write as if a signature really can do the work of sus-
taining self-identity, coherence, prior and future existence . . . all of which is put 
into doubt by the very necessity of it.”33),  Robyn Wiegman’s Dear Ian is more 
 
 26. Id. at 65. 
 27. 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). 
 28. Ranjana Khanna, Signatures of the Impossible, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 69 (2004). 
 29. Id. at 71. 
 30. Id. at 74. 
 31. Id. at 83. 
 32. Id. at 90. 
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steadfastly interested in demonstrating what the signatory difference means in 
light of the consequence that Taking a Break from Feminism in this case resigns 
to a man, Ian, a critical space of knowledge production about women formerly 
maintained by a lesbian, Janet.  In an epistolary response, Wiegman addresses 
Halley directly, questioning “hir” strawman construction of both “a highly dis-
ciplined and disciplining” 34 normative feminism whose urgent refusal thus cre-
ates the space of Ian’s usurpation and the counterfiction of a wider, epistemi-
cally freer queer epistemology, ethically unimpeachable.  Alternately impatient 
and sympathetic, Wiegman sets out to correct certain of Halley’s assumptions 
about the convergentist capacity of feminism and queer theory that both un-
derwrite Halley’s belief in the feminist failure in sexuality studies and inspire its 
abandonment in a politics of vigilant divergentism.  Feminism and queer theory, 
Weigman emphasizes, are not altogether analogous projects as Halley supposes.  
Between them are “discordant temporalities” that, in fact, militate against con-
vergentist ambitions.35  These discordant temporalities are crucial to Wiegman’s 
critique of Queer Theory by Men and Halley’s fundamental reinforcement of the 
heterosexist framework that, in the interest of foregrounding the erotic econo-
mies of men’s sexual interests, straight and gay, erases, Weigman points out, the 
lesbian figure altogether. 
Wiegman posits five discriminations at the base of the temporalities divid-
ing feminism and queer theory.  She argues, first, that queer theory’s capacity to 
deconstruct certain of feminism’s historical presumptions is evidence of neither 
“the enduring truth of the queer theoretic” nor “the faulty logic of feminism,”36 
but rather of queer theory’s instrumentality in making legible the nuance be-
tween what is finally a knowledge project (for example, feminist epistemology, 
queer theory) and what is, on the other hand, an academically informed reform 
agenda (for example, gay and lesbian studies, popular feminism).  Second, cri-
tique alone is insufficient to produce the divergence Halley believes Queer The-
ory by Men to perform.  It is only a part of the bigger process by which diver-
gence brings to light the difference between what Weigman’s calls “the social 
movement formulation of identity studies”37 and the knowledge project(s) be-
neath identity production and politics.  Third, while it is important to recognize 
the distinction between dedicated knowledge projects and reform efforts (per 
Weigman’s first articulation of discordant temporalities), social movements are 
themselves knowledge projects too that help to foreground the politics of 
knowledge production—what we know, who knows it, and how to organize 
what we think we know—in and around the academy.  Fourth, the study of 
identity and its politics cannot be properly understood apart from a considera-
tion of the social field that confers its inaugural currency, nor can such study be 
limited to social fields alone.  Finally, Wiegman proposes that, contrary to the 
popular belief that institutionalization undermines movements, the institution-
alization of identity studies as, say, Women’s Studies or Gender Studies, may 
well be an important part of the divergentist wish to bring into view and formal-
 
 34. Robyn Wiegman, Dear Ian, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 93, 94 (2004). 
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ize new complementing genealogies of identitarian knowledge and their limits.  
All of these discriminations, Wiegman puts forward in the service of an argu-
ment for a politics of divergence that nevertheless issues from very different mo-
tives than Halley’s.  Dear Ian urges Halley toward an expanded consideration of 
the politics of divergentism.  In a way, feminism lives, however embattled, and 
is preserved, however precariously, by just such a politics.  Under a divergentist 
commitment, Taking a Break from Feminism may be infinitely easier said than 
done. 
Insofar as the three response pieces by Jaine Gaines, Ranjana Khanna, and 
Robyn Wiegman, all, in greater or lesser volume, seem earnest in their effort to 
persuade Ian Halley of the unimaginable difficulty of Taking a Break from 
Feminism, it would seem that, despite its convergentist aversion, and for all its 
talk and text about divergentism, Queer Theory by Men has provoked a produc-
tive convergence of theoretical voices after all.  On the state of feminism, on sex 
and the social, on the law and the politics of positionality (in marriage, in sex 
acts, in institutions), to say nothing of the curiosity of queer theory by men, 
these are divergently suggestive essays—all four them—each one in its own 
right.  But the conversation they enact here in the Duke Journal of Gender Law and 
Policy is very nearly a convergentist’s fantasy. 
 
